The free will debate is one of the oldest in philosophy, and neuroscience has given it new urgency. Benjamin Libet's experiments in the 1980s appeared to show that the brain initiates action before conscious awareness of the decision — suggesting that 'free will' may be post-hoc rationalisation rather than genuine causation. Hard determinists conclude that all choices are the inevitable outcome of prior causes and that moral responsibility is therefore incoherent. Compatibilists respond that this misunderstands what free will requires: not uncaused causation, but acting in accordance with your own reasons and values, without coercion. Peter Strawson's influential argument focuses not on metaphysics but on practice: our reactive attitudes — gratitude, resentment, moral praise and blame — are so deeply embedded in human life that philosophical determinism cannot dislodge them. Whether or not free will exists in a metaphysical sense, we cannot stop holding each other responsible.

💡 Did you know? Libet's experiments have been extensively replicated and challenged. More recent neuroscience suggests the 'readiness potential' he measured may not represent a decision at all — the debate about what his results actually show has never been resolved.