Epistemic injustice — a term developed by philosopher Miranda Fricker — refers to wrongs done to people in their capacity as knowers. There are two primary forms. Testimonial injustice occurs when someone is given less credibility than they deserve because of prejudice related to their social identity — a woman being dismissed by her doctor, a Black witness being disbelieved in court. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when a gap in collective interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage in understanding or communicating their experience — the absence of concepts like 'marital rape' or 'workplace harassment' before those concepts became widely recognised. Both forms of epistemic injustice are not merely inconvenient; they are, Fricker argues, a distinctive kind of moral wrong — one that attacks people not just in their interests but in their fundamental standing as human knowers.

💡 Did you know? Miranda Fricker's book 'Epistemic Injustice' (2007) has been cited over 10,000 times across philosophy, law, medicine, and social science — making it one of the most cross-disciplinary philosophy books of the twenty-first century.